# Selic at 14+ in 2027: what will happen to companies

A scenario with the Selic rate at 14% or more, with no cut. Inflation at 5%. Real interest above 9%, the highest in the world, for the third year in a row.

- Section: Business
- Published: November 3, 2026
- Address: https://ceoone.com.br/en/article/selic-at-14-in-2027-what-will-happen-to-companies
- Em português: https://ceoone.com.br/artigo/selic-14-em-2027-o-que-vai-acontecer-com-as-empresas.md

![João Carlos Camargo in a dark suit, white shirt and blue tie, smiling, in front of a wooden wall](https://pub-b80e49b2737940b3ab5d3f20d0578192.r2.dev/artigos/selic-14-em-2027-o-que-vai-acontecer-com-as-empresas-foto.webp)

Photo: Courtesy

## Key points

- With the Selic rate at 14% or more for another year, João Carlos Camargo projects that 32% to 36% of listed companies will lack the cash to pay their own interest in 2027.
- By his estimates, judicial recovery filings reach 3,500 to 4,200, with GDP between -0.5% and +0.5% and unemployment of 7.5% to 8.5%.
- For companies, his advice is to renegotiate before they need to, stretch debt past 2028 and sell non-core assets now.

*By João Carlos Camargo*

## Author's note

This is not an analysis of economics, nor of political science, nor a market reading. It is a reading of vision.

It comes from an unusual position: I sit in every chair. I talk to the left and to the right, including the most radical wings of each side, and to everything in between. I talk to the financial market, to civil society, to industry, to retail and to commerce — to those who produce, those who employ, those who decide.

Each of these worlds sees a real part of the problem. The financier sees the yield curve. The industrialist sees the order that never came. The politician sees the voter. The left sees social spending, the right sees the public accounts. They are all looking at the same country, from different angles.

What I present here is an attempt to bring these angles together into a single reading. It is not a model, it is a sensitivity built by listening. The 2027 numbers are orders of magnitude, not forecasts. The direction, however, is the one I see: with the Selic at 14+ for another year and no clear fiscal signal, Brazil stays on its feet — but many Brazilian companies do not.

I write to warn, not to frighten. Those who read in time still have something they can do.

## What is already happening (real data)

26% of listed companies do not generate enough cash to pay their own interest.

9.1 million companies in default, owing R$ 233 billion. A record.

2,466 companies filed for judicial recovery in 2025. A record.

Large companies in judicial recovery: there used to be 25 per quarter. Today there are 50.

R$ 700 billion of corporate debt under renegotiation with banks and funds.

The public sector spent R$ 1.18 trillion on interest in 12 months — 4 times the health budget.

All this on the bet that interest rates would fall. If they don't, the bill comes due.

## 1. The math of an ordinary company

A mid-sized manufacturer. Revenue of R$ 500 million. Debt of R$ 150 million at CDI + 3%. Margin of 12%.

|  | Today | In 2027 (revenue -8%) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Cash generation (EBITDA) | R$ 60 mi | R$ 46 mi |
| Interest for the year | R$ 26 mi | R$ 29 mi (the bank raises the spread) |
| Left to invest and amortize | R$ 34 mi | R$ 17 mi |

Alert: what is left is cut in half. Amortization no longer fits. The company asks to stretch its debt. In 2028, it joins the 26%. Multiply that by thousands.

## 2. Where the country's money goes

Of every R$ 100 saved in Brazil, R$ 75 go to government bonds at 14% or more, risk free. That leaves R$ 25 to finance the entire real economy, at CDI + 5% or more.

In practice: nobody builds a factory in 2027. The 2028 economy is born smaller.

## And the stock market won't come to the rescue

The capital markets door has been shut for five years. Between 2021 and 2026 the B3 had no IPOs. In 2026 there was a single one, Compass, for R$ 3 billion. For comparison: in 2021 alone there were more than 40.

With the Selic at 14+, that won't change. Nobody swaps a risk-free 14% for shares in a company that can't pay its own interest. Without an IPO, a company that needs capital has two ways out: expensive debt or selling a stake to a foreigner at a discount. I see no prospect of IPOs in 2027.

Alert: with no stock market, no cheap credit and no local investors, the capital left for Brazilian companies is that of the foreign fund buying at the bottom.

## 3. The 2027 numbers (estimate)

The author's estimates based on 2025-26 data. Orders of magnitude, not exact forecasts.

| Indicator | 2026 | 2027, Selic 14+ |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Listed companies that can't pay interest | 26% | 32% to 36% |
| Companies in default | 9.1 million | 10 to 10.5 million |
| Corporate debt in default | R$ 233 bi | R$ 290 to 320 bi |
| Judicial recovery filings | ~2,800 | 3,500 to 4,200 |
| Large companies in judicial recovery per quarter | ~50 | 70 to 90 |
| Corporate debt under renegotiation | R$ 700 bi | R$ 900 bi to 1 tri |
| Bankruptcies declared | — | +40% to +60% |
| GDP | ~1.5% | -0.5% to +0.5% |
| Unemployment | ~6% | 7.5% to 8.5% |
| Interest on public debt (12 months) | R$ 1.18 tri | R$ 1.25 to 1.35 tri |
| Gross debt / GDP | ~80% | 84% to 86% |

Alert: a mild recession with high business mortality. It isn't 2015. It is worse for those who produce: the economy doesn't break, companies do.

## 4. The 2027 calendar, quarter by quarter

| Quarter | What happens |
| --- | --- |
| Jan to Mar | Copom holds. The market gets it: high rates for a long time. Those who planned to roll over debt find the cost has risen 2-3 points. First judicial recoveries of well-known mid-sized names: industry, logistics, agribusiness. |
| Apr to Jun | First-quarter results show cash falling and interest rising. Agencies downgrade ratings. Credit funds face redemptions and sell debentures. Good companies pay more because of the bad ones. |
| Jul to Sep | Second wave: suppliers of the companies in judicial recovery go under. Layoffs in retail, construction and logistics. Household default rises and drags down consumption. States ask the federal government for a bailout. |
| Oct to Dec | Peak of judicial recoveries in the cycle. Political pressure on the Central Bank. The government announces credit through BNDES, which only pays off old debt. Assets sold to foreigners at a 30-40% discount. |

## 5. Who goes under, in order

1st Micro and small businesses: straight to bankruptcy, without judicial recovery. Invisible in the statistics, visible in jobs.

2nd Retail and consumer credit: the line behind Casas Bahia and Pão de Açúcar.

3rd Logistics and transport: expensive diesel + interest + customers who don't pay.

4th Leveraged agribusiness: those who bought land and machinery with the Selic at 2%.

5th Construction and real estate development: idle inventory, cancelled sales, interest on the land.

6th Health and education: acquisition debt + claims ratios and dropout.

7th Manufacturing: half of those that already can't pay their interest.

## 6. What to do now: companies

Renegotiate before you need to. Those who reach the bank with cash negotiate. Those who arrive without it get handed a plan.

Stretch everything past 2028, even if you pay a spread. Term is worth more than rate.

Sell the non-core asset now, at a 15% discount, before you sell the core one at 40%.

Swap CDI debt for fixed-rate or IPCA+ where it fits. It is a bet that the worst will last.

Shorten customer terms, demand guarantees. Your customer's default becomes yours.

Cut any investment that doesn't pay back in 18 months. The new factory can wait for 2028.

## 7. Signs it will get worse: stay alert

Long rates (DI 2031+) rising even with the Selic on hold.

The dollar above R$ 6.00 on a sustained basis.

Redemptions from private credit funds.

Debenture spreads of good companies widening.

A finance minister named without a clear fiscal rule in the first 100 days.

Alert, the risk off the table: if the market concludes that high interest makes the public debt worse (fiscal dominance), the crisis stops being linear. The dollar at R$ 6.50, long rates at 17-18%, a Central Bank out of control. Then the numbers on this page double.

## 8. There is a way out, and it is about confidence, not credit

A subsidized credit line doesn't solve it: it pays off old debt and postpones the problem by a month. What solves it is a confidence shock. It has a name and a recipe:

A strong name at the Finance Ministry, in the first days, that the market recognizes and Congress respects.

Lula 1, not Lula 3. The Lula of 2003 brought the market inside, ran a surplus and reaped falling interest rates and rising investment. That script has worked once before.

Take care of the social side, and bring society along. Social spending isn't cut. But the State doesn't need to carry everything alone: engaging companies and large fortunes in philanthropy is public policy, not a favor.

Remove the subsidy from those who can pay. The diesel subsidy goes to wealthy industry, not to the truck driver. Cheap gasoline fuels Porsches and Ferraris. The right thing is a diesel allowance for those who drive trucks and a gasoline allowance for those who need it, not a universal discount for those who don't.

Review mandatory spending. More than 90% of the budget is already committed from the start. Without touching that, there is no possible adjustment, only patchwork.

Real interest falling 2 points relieves companies' cash more than any government program. And interest only falls when confidence rises.

## 9. Conclusion

Brazil will not go broke. It has reserves of US$ 300 billion, a record trade surplus and well-capitalized banks. The risk isn't the country — it's what is left of it after another year of Selic at 14+.

What is left is a country where lending to the government is the best business, where the factory doesn't get built, the stock market doesn't open, and the good company changes hands at a discount. A country of rentiers and of foreigners buying at the bottom.

This is not destiny. It is a choice. The government that takes office in January has four years, a majority to negotiate with and a Central Bank of its own choosing. It also has the memory of 2003, when the same president showed that confidence is built in months, not decades.

The choice is between the Lula the market feared and then applauded, and the Lula the market has already priced in. The first version saves companies. The second watches them go under.

I write to warn, not to frighten. Those who read in time still have something they can do.

*João Carlos Camargo is a media entrepreneur, founder and chairman of the board of Esfera Brasil, former chairman of CNN Brasil (2022–2025) and a partner in radio stations such as Rádio Disney, 89 FM, Alpha FM and Transamérica.*

## Sources and editorial notes

- Central Bank of Brazil, Serasa Experian, RK Partners (via Estadão, 11/1/2026), RGF-Bizdoc, TTR Data. 2027 projections: the author's estimates.

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